§ Rule 607. Impeachment of witness
Rule 607. Impeachment of witness
(a) Who may impeach. The credibility of any witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.
(b) Evidence to impeach. The credibility of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except as otherwise provided by statute or these Rules.
Comment: Pa.R.E. 607(a) is identical to F.R.E. 607. The Federal Rules have no provision similar to section (b).
Section (a)--Pa.R.E. 607(a) abolishes completely the common law rule that prohibited a party from impeaching a witness called by that party. The common law rule, which applied to all forms of impeachment, has been criticized. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); 3A Wigmore, Evidence §§ 897-99 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 1 McCormick, Evidence § 38 (4th ed. 1992). To the extent that there are any vestiges of the “no impeachment” prohibition remaining in Pennsylvania, Pa.R.E. 607(a) sweeps them away.
Pa.R.E. 607(a) allows impeachment by all of the methods provided for in Pa.R.E. 607(b), 608, 609 and 613.
Section (b)--The methods that may be used to impeach credibility are subject to Pa.R.E. 401, which defines relevant evidence. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules clearly contemplated that evidence of bias could be used to impeach credibility even though nothing in those Rules specifically covered the subject. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). The Court pointed to F.R.E. 401, defining relevancy, and F.R.E. 402, providing for the admissibility of all relevant evidence, in support of its holding. Id. The Court commented that “[a] successful showing of bias ... would have a tendency to make the facts to which [the witness] testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony.” Id. at 51.
Pa.R.E. 401 and 402 are similar to their Federal counterparts, and they, too, support the impeaching of credibility by any means having any tendency to cast doubt on the witness' testimony. However, the words “except as otherwise provided by statute or these Rules” in Pa.R.E. 607(b) incorporate a number of provisions that circumscribe the breadth of the Rule. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104 (the Rape Shield Law). Impeachment evidence is also subject to Pa.R.E. 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Similarly, Pa.R.E. 501, which preserves all privileges “as they now exist or may be modified by law,” would exclude any evidence relevant to credibility that might be covered by existing or later developed privileges, including those created by case law. In addition, Pa.R.E. 607(b) is limited and supplemented by Pa.R.E. 608 (dealing with evidence of character and conduct of a witness), Pa.R.E. 609 (relating to impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime), Pa.R.E. 610 (covering religious beliefs or opinions) and Pa.R.E. 613 (regarding prior statements of witnesses).
Pa.R.E. 607(b), however, is not curtailed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, the questioning of a defendant who testifies in a criminal case for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed, been convicted of or charged with another offense or that the defendant has a bad character or reputation. In Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973), this statute was interpreted to apply only to cross-examination. Hence, it affects only the timing and method of impeachment of a defendant; it does not bar the impeachment entirely.
Since the credibility of any witness depends upon his or her powers of perception, capacity to remember, ability to communicate accurately and honesty or integrity, it may always be attacked by showing shortcomings in any of those areas. See Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977); (McCormick, Evidence, § 44 (4th ed. 1992).