§ 5/8-2501 Expert Witness Standards

§ 8-2501. Expert Witness Standards.

     In any case in which the standard of care applicable to a medical professional is at issue, the court shall apply the following standards to determine if a witness qualifies as an expert witness and can testify on the issue of the appropriate standard of care.

     (a) Whether the witness is board certified or board eligible, or has completed a residency, in the same or substantially similar medical specialties as the defendant and is otherwise qualified by significant experience with the standard of care, methods, procedures, and treatments relevant to the allegations against the defendant;

     (b) Whether the witness has devoted a majority of his or her work time to the practice of medicine, teaching or University based research in relation to the medical care and type of treatment at issue which gave rise to the medical problem of which the plaintiff complains;

     (c) whether the witness is licensed in the same profession with the same class of license as the defendant if the defendant is an individual; and

     (d) whether, in the case against a nonspecialist, the witness can demonstrate a sufficient familiarity with the standard  of care practiced in this State.

     An expert shall provide evidence of active practice, teaching, or engaging in university-based research. If retired, an  expert must provide evidence of attendance and completion of continuing education courses for 3 years previous to giving testimony. An expert who has not actively practiced, taught, or been engaged in university-based research, or any combination thereof, during the preceding 5 years may not be qualified as an expert witness.

     The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly apply to causes of action accruing on or after its effective date.

     VALIDITY

     P.A. 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, a comprehensive revision of the law relating to health care and medical malpractice actions, is unconstitutional in its entirety because (i) provisions limiting the recovery of damages for
non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions violate the separation of powers principle of the Illinois  Constitution (ILCON Art. II, Sec. 1) and (ii) other provisions are inseverable. Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill.2d 217 (2010).

     Public Act 89-7, which amended this section, has been held unconstitutional in its entirety by the Illinois Supreme  Court in the case of Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 1997, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 179 Ill.2d 367. P.A. 94-677, effective August 25, 2005, specifically re-enacted this section.